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English Historical Review

English Historical Review is in Modern Era.

English Historical Review Volume 24 1909

A Contemporary Account of the Battle of Tinchebrai.

[28th September 1106] Few battles of English medieval history can vie in importance with that of Tinchebrai. Yet the accounts of the chroniclers are unsatisfactory to the last degree. We depend entirely upon Henry of Huntingdon and Orderic for our knowledge of the tactics adopted on the one side and the other. Neither of these writers had military experience; neither was an eye-witness; and they wrote at least fifteen years after the event. Even if they were in agreement we should still be free to doubt whether their descriptions of the battle were correct. But they appear to disagree, and it is difficult to see how they can be reconciled. Professor Oman, who has examined the evidence more thoroughly than any other modern writer, believes that the discrepancies of Orderic and Huntingdon only exist in the imaginations of critics.1 He holds that Huntingdon supplies the clue to the truth of the matter, and interprets Orderic in such a sense as to make him harmonise with Huntingdon. On the other hand Sir James Ramsay2 adopts the more drastic course of treating Huntingdon's account as worthless, and develops his own theory on the lines suggested by the words of Orderic. The result is that two radically different accounts of the battle are in circulation. To Sir James Ramsay the battle is essentially an affair of cavalry; while Mr. Oman is convinced that the main armies fought on foot, and that the only mounted men in the field were the king's auxiliaries from Brittany and Maine, who are admitted on all hands to have settled the fortune of the day. A new source, which I print below, suggests a third interpretation of the evidence, midway between the two existing theories. This document is a letter describing the battle, which was written within a few days of the event. It shows that neither Huntingdon nor Orderic is completely right, but that each has some ground for his statements. For the fact is that the king at all events used cavalry and infantry in close combination.

Note 1. Art of War in the Middle Ages (1898), p. 379.

Note 2. The'Foundations of England, ii. 254.

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Among the manuscripts belonging to Jesus College, Oxford (now deposited in the Bodleian library), there is a small folio volume of the later twelfth century, which contains Bede's tract De Tabernaculo et uasis eius, the Libellus de ponderibus attributed to the same author, and some miscellanea in hands of a slightly later date than that of the original scribe. At the head of these miscellanea are placed two letters relating to Tinchebrai. The first is the well-known despatch of Henry I announcing his victory to Anselm: a copy which only differs from that given by Eadmer3 in that it adds the attesting clause, omitted by Eadmer as irrelevant.4 The second letter is from a priest of Fécamp to a priest of Séez, announcing the king's success and giving some details of the battle. It must have been written soon after the battle, but not before the king and his army had arrived at Caen, on their way to Rouen. Here our priest received an audience from the king and probably collected his information. The value of his evidence was recognised by Coxe in his catalogue of the Jesus College MSS., and also by Sir T. Duffus Hardy.5 Both quote some sentences from the letter. But it has never been edited in full nor have its contents received due consideration. We do not know the name either of the writer or of his correspondent. We only learn from the letter that the priest of Fécamp was a friend of Robert d'Estouteville, a leading partisan of the duke and one of the principal captives taken in the battle; that nevertheless the priest rejoiced in the king's victory as a pledge of better times in store for Normandy; and that he had obtained from Henry some remission of the imposts levied on the lands of his church. He may have been at Tinchebrai; but he does not say so; and his facts are such as he might glean at second hand. Though precisely informed regarding the battle array of the king, he is vague as to that of the duke; and of the actual conflict he only says that it lasted barely an hour, and that Robert of Belesme was the first to fly. Still his letter deserves a careful perusal. It throws new light on two interesting questions, the strength of the forces engaged and the manner in which they were handled. The letter runs as follows :—

Note 3. Hist. Nov. p. 184, Rolls series.

Note 4. The clause runs Teste Waldrico Cancellario apud Wellebof. The place in question is Elbcuf-sur-Andelle, near Rouen. Henry visited the Norman capital between 28 September, the date of Tinchebrai, and 15 October, when he was at Lisieux for a Great Council. We can therefore fix the date of this letter within narrow limits. The mention of Waldric confirms the hypothesis that he is identica with that Gualdricus capellanus regis who took duke Robert prisoner on the field of battle.

Note 5. Descr. Catal.of MSS. relating to the Hist. of Great Britain and Ireland, ii. 99,

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[Jesus College, Oxford, MS. li. fo. 104.]

To his lord the priest of Sagy, the priest of Fécamp, greetings and prayers. I bring good news, my lord, since I know how eager you are for such tidings. Our lord the king fought with his brother at Tinchebray on the third day before the Kalends of October (29 September), at the third hour; and the battle was drawn up in this order. In the first line were the men of Bayeux, Avranches, and Coutances, all on foot. To these were added seven hundred knights arrayed for each battle-line; besides this, the Count of Maine and the Count of the Bretons, Alan Fergant, encircled the army with up to a thousand knights, all gildones (mercenaries) and servants having been removed. For the king's whole army was reckoned at nearly forty thousand men of this sort. The count, however, had six thousand, with seven hundred knights; and the battle scarcely lasted one hour, when Robert of Bellême at once turned his back, by whose flight all the rest were scattered. The count himself was taken prisoner, and also the Count of Mortain with his barons, and Robert of Stuteville, my friend; all the others were broken and put to flight. Moreover the land was brought under the king's sway; and so that I pass nothing by, this marvel: the king in the battle lost scarcely two men. One alone was wounded, Robert of Bonesbot. When I came to the king he received me kindly at Caen, and freely remitted all that he was demanding of our land. And now peace is restored in the land, thanks be to God. Pray too that it may remain everlasting, and that God may grant us health of mind and body. Farewell.

Domino suo presbytero Sagii presbyter Fiscanni salutem et orationes. Bonum apporto nuntium, domine mi, quoniam uos huius nuntii auidum noui. Rex dominus noster pugnauit cum fratre suo apud Tenercebraium iii kal. Octobris hora tertia; et fuit sic bellum dispositum. In prima acie fuerunt Baiocenses, Abrincatini, et Constantinienses, omnes pedites. Ad hec septingenti equites utrique aciei ordinati; preterea comes Cenomannis et comes Britonum Alanus Fregandus circumcingentes exercitum, usque ad mille equites, remotis omnibus gildonibus et seruis. Nam totus exercitus regis prope modum ad XL milia horum estimabatur. Comes uero ad VI milia habuit, equites septingentos, et uix una hora prelium stetit, Roberto de Belismo statim terga uertente, ex cuius fuga dispersi sunt omnes. Comes uero captus est, eb comes Moritonii cum suis baronibus, Robertus de Stuteuilla amicus meus; reliqui omnes fusi fugatique. Porro terra redacta est sub rege, et nequid uos preteream illud mirum quod rex in prelio uix duos amisit. Unus solus uulneratus est, Robertus de Bonesbot. Ad regem cum uenissem benigne me excepit apud Cadomum, et omnia que de terra nostra exigebat uoluntarie indulsit. Et nune pax in terra reddita est, Deo gratias. Vos quoque orate ut sempiterna permaneat, et ut nobis Deus sanitatem mentis et corporis tribuat. VALETE.

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According to Orderic, the duke was inferior in mounted men but his infantry outnumbered those of the king. The story of the priest is very different. He estimates the light infantry of the king at 40,000, of the duke at 6000. These round figures should not be taken too seriously, but they indicate the writer's general impression that in this respect the odds against the duke were six or seven to one. It is not easy to follow the priest's statements as to the cavalry. Bat he appears to say that the king had 2400 mounted men as against 700 on the side of Robert. The source of Orderic's misconception appears to be that Henry's foot-soldiers were for the most part sent to the rear and took no part in the action; they are the gildones et servi of whom the priest speaks so contemptuously. And it should be noticed that the English foot-soldiers, who were undoubtedly on the field, must be included in this category. They were idle and inglorious spectators of the battle in which (according to the boast of their countryman William of Malmesbury) England turned the tables upon Normandy and wiped out the disgrace of Senlac. Of effective foot-soldiers the king may well have had fewer than his brother. Turning now from Orderic to the king's letter, we find again that the priest supplies a wholesome corrective to misrepresentations which might otherwise impose upon us. Henry carefully refrains from mentioning the disparity of his brother's forces ; Robert, he says, had come against him cum omnibus copiis militum et peditum quos prece et pretio adunare potuit [with all the forces of knights and foot soldiers which he could gather together by entreaty and by payment.]. The battle had been fiercely (acriter) contested. Without great loss his men had captured 400 knights and 10,000 infantry, and had slain an enormous number of their opponents. If we accept these figures, it follows that the king had taken more prisoners than there were soldiers, on the priest's computation, in the army of the duke. The fact is that through Henry's letter there runs a note of boastful exaggeration against which we must be on our guard. A battle which was begun and ended within sixty minutes can hardly have been a desperate affair. The priest, no doubt, is indulging in hyperbole when he assures his friend that 'barely two' were killed, and only one man wounded, on the royal side. But the king's losses were so light that we may regard the result of the battle as a foregone conclusion.

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We now come to the question of tactics. Henry of Huntingdon asserts that the knights of both armies dismounted and fought on foot.6 Orderic, though he gives a detailed description of the forces, omits to enlighten us on this important point; his language is ambiguous. He describes the king's battle-order as follows :—

"Then the armored battle-lines were drawn up, and, packed together in disciplined order, they advanced. The first line was commanded by Ranulf of Bayeux; the second by Robert, count of Meulan; and the third by William of Warenne. … But the king kept with himself the English and Normans as foot soldiers; while he stationed the men of Maine and the Bretons, under Count Helias, far out in the field."

"Deinde ferratae acies ordinatae sunt, et disciplinabiliter stipatae processerunt. Primam aciem rexit Rannulfus Baiocensis ; secundam Robertus comes Mellentensis; tertiam vero Guillelmus de Guarenna. ... Rex autem Anglos et Normannos secum pedites detinuit ; Cenomannos autem et Britones longe in campo cum Helia consule constituit."7

Note 6. Hist. Angl. p. 235, ed. T. Arnold.

Note 7. Hist. Eccl. iv. p. 230, ed. le Prévost.

Mr. Oman argues that the pedites of this passage are identical with the three ferratae acies. But this is an unnatural construction to put upon the Latin; and if the king had taken upon himself the general command of the three acies, he would have made himself responsible for leading one of them. The evidence of the priest makes it clear that these pedites are the gildones et servi who were sent to the rear; and Orderic certainly speaks as though the three ferratae acies were equites. Again, the latter uses the word turmae of the duke's first division, that which was the most prominent in the battle; and if his Latin can be trusted, this must mean that they too were cavalry. We agree therefore with Sir James Ramsay in holding that Orderic means to describe the battle as a duel of cavalry. But we do not agree that Orderic is wholly correct. For one thing we have to explain Huntingdon's account, which contradicts Orderic; and it is impossible to accept Sir James's theory that Huntingdon is merely giving an erroneous paraphrase of Orderic: the two narratives are independent in their origin. Secondly, we have to reckon with the priest's letter, which is entitled to rank as evidence above either of our two chroniclers.

The priest, in describing the king's host, makes it clear that infantry played an important part. In prima acie (sc. regis) Juerunt Baiocenses, Abrincatini, et Constantinienses, omnes pedites. Ad hec septingenti equites utrique aciei ordinati. He only allows for two divisions; uterque must mean 'each of two.' But the first of these is composite and corresponds to two of the acies described in Orderic. In the king's vanguard there was a division of footsoldiers supported by 700 knights; behind these came a second division of 700 knights. A long way behind was posted the general mass of infantry commanded by the king. The formation adopted was not a line, as in the account given by Mr. Oman, but a column, probably in échelon. The duke's army was similarly arrayed. Hence the main fighting was between the first divisions of each army. Neither in Orderic nor in Huntingdon do we hear of any other divisions sharing in the mélée. But the duke, to compensate for his deficiency in knights, had placed infantry in the centre of his column, between the mounted divisions led by William of Mortain and Robert of Belesme. These foot-soldiers were thrown into confusion by a flank attack against which they were wholly unprotected; and the centre of the duke's column being shattered the whole formation 'dissolved,' and the event of the battle was decided. This at least is our interpretation of Orderic, who alone gives something like a picture of the situation. Orderic, if we may hazard a guess, got his information from old soldiers and did not use it with any great intelligence. Here, as elsewhere, he presents us with the materials of a sound narrative. He reports his informants fairly enough, but he seems to report them without a clear perception of their meaning. H. W. C. Davis.

English Historical Review Volume 29 1914